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Abstract 
The effect of cash holdings on the value of a firm has attracted the attention of 
researchers as well as shareholders. China has been receiving more influence from the world 
market since it became a member of World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11th 2001. 
Affected by the financial crisis in 2008, the cash holdings tend to play different roles on the 
valuation of a company. This paper attempts to find out whether cash holdings offer positive 
effects or not on corporate market valuation based on the Chinese context. We apply a modified 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value. Furthermore, the influence of cash holdings on Tobin’s Q 
is analyzed for both pre and post sub-prime crisis period.  
 
Keywords:  Cash Holding; Corporate Valuation; China; Tobin’s Q; Financial Crisis; Multivariate 
Regression 
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1. Introduction  
Firms, private or public, have items on their books treated as non-operating assets. These 
assets generally fall into four categories. The first and most obvious type is cash and near-cash 
investments. A large number of companies with a substantial amount of cash balances make these 
risk-free or low-risk investments. The second is investments in equities or fixed income securities 
issued by other institutions in order to follow specific strategies. The third type is private or 
public holdings in other firms, which can be classified in various ways by accountants. Finally, 
there are assets that do not generate cash flows but still have a certain values. If little or no serious 
attention is paid to these assets, the consequences can be quite serious. In this paper, we examine 
some of the challenges associated with the volume of cash holdings as well as their influence on 
valuing a firm.  
1.1 Reasons for holding cash  
1.1.1 Operational (Transactional) Motives 
Firms need cash for operations and the needs vary along with different reasons. 
Generally, we can conclude that the cash needs for operations are a function of the following 
variables: 
 Cash or Credit oriented business: Cash-oriented firms tend to have higher demands for 
cash than credit-oriented firms. 
 Size of transactions: Firms that generate revenues from various small transactions tend 
to maintain more cash for their business than those that obtain their revenues through 
a few large transactions. Additionally, some economies of scale would allow larger 
firms to maintain lower cash balances for operations than smaller firms.  
 Dependency on modern banking system: With the fast development of banking 
system, a decreasing number of transactions are cash-based. Consequently, cash 
requirements is expected to experience a falling trend as the banking system becomes 
more sophisticated and comprehensive by allowing customers to pay with credit cards 
or cheques.  
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1.1.2 Precautionary Motives 
Precautionary motives mainly refer to the capacity of covering unanticipated expenses or 
meeting unspecified contingencies. This component is expected to be a function of the following 
variables:  
 Volatility in the economy: With other factors remaining unchanged, it is obvious that 
firms should accumulate more cash under unstable and volatile macro economic 
conditions than they do under mature and stable macro economic conditions. In other 
words, shocks are more likely to happen on the former case and thus drive firms to 
have higher requirements of cash.  
 Volatility in operations: All other factors being equal, firms with more volatile 
operating cash flows are expected to hold higher cash balances in order to meet 
contingencies than those with stable cash flows.  
 Competitive environment: It cannot be ignored that the presence of fierce competition 
in the industry will add to instability. Firms operating in more intensely competitive 
sectors tend to hold more cash in hand than those that are immune from competition.  
 Financial leverage: Debt ratio is a financial ratio that indicates the percentage of a 
company’s assets that provided via debt (Debt ratio = Total Debt/Total Assets). A firm 
with higher debt ratio has committed itself to making higher interest payments in the 
future. The interest payments will in turn lead to higher cash balances.  
1.1.3 Potential Capital Investments in the Future 
In the real world, firms often face constraints or costs that internally or externally restrict 
their access to raising new capital to fund good investments. Hence firms set aside certain amount 
of cash to cover needs for future investments. In this way, firms can seize good opportunities with 
more confidence. This component is expected to be a function of the following variables: 
 Magnitude and uncertainty about future investments: Firms having both substantial 
needs for potential future investments and high uncertainty about these investment 
opportunities tend to set aside large amount of cash in order to cover future investment 
costs. Additionally, firms that have large but predictable investment needs can set 
aside right amount of cash in advance while those with small investment needs can get 
away from holding substantial cash balances.  
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 Access to capital markets: Firms with easier and cheaper access to capital markets 
should hold less cash for future investments than firms without the access. Cash 
balances also tend to decrease if with an increase in the financial choices.  
 Information asymmetry about investments: Firms will face big challenges to raise 
capital at a fair price if external investors receive less information about the potential 
payoffs they would obtain through investments than firms do. For instance, firms are 
expected to acquire relatively larger cash balances when projects are difficult to assess 
or monitor.  
1.1.4 Strategic Cash Holdings 
At times, some companies regard cash as special weapon that can help them take 
advantage of opportunities that may arise in the future though these opportunities may have not 
shown up yet. What’s more, holding cash is great when cash is a scarce resource or capital market 
is difficult to access.   
1.1.5 Management Interests  
One characteristic of publicly traded companies is the separation of management and 
ownership. In many firms, managers have their own deals that can be funded through cash. If this 
idea holds, we expect cash balances to vary among companies based on the following reasons:  
 Corporate governance: Companies where stockholders have little or no power tend to 
have larger cash balances.  
 Insider holdings: When insiders not only hold a large portion of the company but also 
are part of the management, we will expect to see larger cash balances accumulating 
in the firm.  
1.2 Value of Cash  
Based on traditional method, cash holdings are regarded as zero NPV investments. One-
dollar cash will bring about one-dollar increase in the value of the firm. Based on simple 
corporate finance knowledge, one dollar in the future can be discounted back on the risk-free 
interest rate in order to find out its present value. In perfect capital markets, it is expected to 
obtain the result mentioned above. Hence, it is irrelative whether the firm pays out cash as 
dividends or holds on to it. If the firm pays out the dividends to investors, it could raise value of 
positive NPV projects. However, the result may not hold if capital market is imperfect or if 
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agency costs exist in the market between managers and stockholders or if conflicts appear 
between stock and bondholders. For instance, it is difficult or costly to transfer cash into or out of 
the firm owing to taxes and floatation costs. Ultimately, borne by the shareholders, these 
transaction costs will influence the valuations of cash holdings. 
Besides, different jurisdictions and the status of investors will expose effects on the 
actions of both firms and individuals. First of all, the tradeoff theory indicates that a country’s 
level of investor protection may affect the relative prices or tradeoffs when managers make 
decisions. The methods that will maximize shareholders’ wealth in countries offering outstanding 
protections may not be the optimal methods for other countries. Consequently, managers tend to 
make different decisions in countries where investors’ rights are poorly protected due to fewer 
constraints. Secondly, the cost theory claims that it becomes more difficult for non-controlling 
investors to generate a fair return from their investments because of agency conflicts that are hard 
to govern. In general, as one of the developing countries, China has become an interesting topic 
around the entire world due to different policy structure, culture background and way of 
development. We predict that Chinese companies are expected to hold more cash in hand in order 
to avoid transaction costs, reduce risks (cash is regarded as a buffer) and comply with cultural 
thoughts.  
Using a sample that includes over eight hundred Chinese listed companies for over ten 
years, we find that Chinese listed companies tend to hold more cash in hand. From the 
perspective of industrial sections, commercial sector is found to have more cash balances than the 
other sectors with a 23.8% Q2 (a cash index that will be explained later in the paper), followed by 
utilities sector with a 19.2% Q2. The generals sector is found to have the lowest cash balances 
because of industrial nature.  
The structure of the paper lays out as follows: Section 1 provides a brief introduction on 
the determinants of holding cash and the value of cash. Section 2 is for literature review, which 
gives a short examination of the basic knowledge for the further study. Section 3 presents detailed 
methodologies used in this paper. Section 4 includes the data and results based on the 
methodologies mentioned above. The data from 2004 to 2013 is analysed in details in this 
section. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
  9 
2. Literature Review  
An interesting fact of the financial market is that firms hold different levels of cash. This 
phenomenon highlights two questions. Firstly, what value do investors place on the cash holdings 
of a firm? Secondly, how cash holding influence companies? Undeniably, identifying the effect 
of cash holding has been a widely debated issue within academic circles and among practitioners. 
Many economic literatures have mentioned considerations about liquid assets that feature issues 
over cash holdings.  
Most of the previous studies addressed the reasons why firms hold cash and what impacts 
it would expose to their investment policies, as well as to determine whether managers waste cash 
or use it to increase firm value. Pinkowitz and Williamson (October 8, 2002) extended their study 
to the examination of cash value measured by shareholders through using regression approach of 
Fama and French (1998). They finally concluded that firms should hold cash with a limitation on 
the total amount. They found that shareholders value a marginal dollar of cash at a significant 
premium to face value. More specifically, the evidence in this paper seems to support the 
contentions of both Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986). Similarly, Opler et.al (1999) and 
Harford (1999) also pointed out that several major characteristics, including access to capital 
market, volatility in cash flows and availability of growth opportunities, provided positive 
response to holding cash. 
In November 2003, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson had their essay published. In this 
paper, they emphasized the relationship between two theories (trade-off theory and agency 
theory) and the determinants of liquid asset holdings of firms across countries. They believed that 
the determinants of liquid asset holdings are largely consistent with both theories according to 
empirical analysis. Additionally, they also found out that the liquid assets in countries with poor 
investor protection made less contribution to the value of minority shares than that in countries 
with better protections. The results provided evidence for the importance of agency costs in how 
minority investors value cash held by corporations.  
Apart from valuation of cash balances, in September 2005, Damodaran stated in his paper 
that there were generally five motives for holding cash, including operational motive, 
precautionary motives, future capital investments, strategic cash holdings, and management 
interests. As it is one of the risk-free assets, cash earns low rate of return, which indicates that the 
safest way to deal with cash is to separate it from operating assets and to value it respectively in 
both discounted cash flow and relative valuation.   
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Ozkan and Ozkan (2003) offered a detailed method about corporate cash holdings among 
UK companies through a cross-sectional regression. The result suggested that ownership structure 
of firms played an important role in determining cash holdings of UK firms. Their findings also 
revealed that there existed a non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and cash 
holdings. Similarly, D.H. Wang and H.G. Wang (2007) proposed a regression method in order to 
analyze the effects of cash holdings on the valuation of Chinese firms based on data between 
2003 and 2006. Through a multi-variable regression, they believed that there existed inverted U-
shape relationship between cash holdings and firms’ value. They also pointed out that an increase 
in cash holdings would lead to a rise in firms’ value when the amount of cash holdings is within a 
certain limit. However, if cash holding exceeds a certain level, the existence of agency issues 
would drive the value of firms downward.  
In 2011, Q. Mei and Srinivasan offered a detailed numerical analysis about the situation 
of holding cash among Canadian companies from 2001 to 2010. Considering the financial crisis 
of 2008, they hoped to observe differences in pre and post financial crisis period. In summary, 
they did find some evidence that the valuation of firms is positively related to cash holdings and 
the relation is affected by market crisis. However, the effect was not uniform across sectors. 
Recent years have seen swift developments in Asian economy, and this phenomenon has 
attracted an increasing number of scholars as well as investors. According to various results listed 
above, there are no exact conclusions about economies in Chinese mainland. Whether the 
financial crisis bring about changes to the structure of cash holdings and whether China provides 
a different result as a developing country are still unknown. Therefore, we will examine the cash 
holdings among Chinese listed companies with a ten-year span.  
Up to now, the effects of cash holdings seem to be ambiguous. The predicaments faced 
here are whether holding cash is beneficial for Chinese companies and what the suitable amounts 
of cash holdings are for firms. Our primary objectives in this study are to ascertain: (1) the 
connections between corporate cash holdings and market valuation of firms in the Chinese 
market; (2) deviations in the connections between corporate cash holdings and market valuation 
of firms during financial crisis; (3) the quantitative relations between cash holding and market 
valuation of firms. 
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3. Methodology  
With this study, we aim to probe into the connection between cash holding and corporate 
market value. We are especially interested in how the situations differ during the years of 
financial turbulences. 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) pointed out that the higher the level of cash, the less the 
marginal value it adds to firms. Moreover, for firms suffering from agency issues, a higher level 
of cash holdings may even indicate negative impacts on the value. 
The method that we apply is Tobin’s Q. Instead of the standard form of Tobin’s Q, we 
use a modified form which is suggested by a Q. Mei and G. Srinivasan (2011) report that 
emphasizes cash value to market value of securities. 
By definition, if firms have a portion of assets that are hard to capture value objectively 
from accounting point of view such as intangibles, or the projects that the firms have are value 
adding, then we can expect our modified Tobin’s Q to be higher. Otherwise, if the projects bring 
undesirable deficits then we can expect modified Tobin’s Q to be much lower. 
The method, we apply, not only creates a modified Tobin’s Q (later we call Q1), but also 
creates a cash index (later we call Q2). With the connections between Q1 and Q2 we can have an 
overall understanding on how cash holding contributes to corporate market value. 
However, one thing we cannot ignore is agency issue. Normally, if agency issue is not 
critical, we can expect stronger positive correlation between Tobin’s Q and cash holdings. But if 
the agency issue is prominent, then the correlation between Q1 and Q2 will be discounted.  
Hereby, we would particularly like to address the following concerns with the Chinese 
background: 
(1) Are there any connections between corporate cash holdings and market valuation of 
firms? 
(2) Are there any deviations in the connections between corporate cash holdings and 
market valuation of firms during turbulent times (i.e. 2008)? 
To answer these concerns, we start by examining the standard form of Tobin’s Q. One 
obstacle when applying the standard form is that the market value of assets is hard to determine. 
To cope with this problem, researchers have searched on the balance sheet and have found that 
the book value of debt, book value of preferred shares and book value of total assets can be 
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perfectly applied to the standard form and such a method closely resembles the original Q 
measure (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). Additionally, in a Chinese setting, book value of preferred 
shares is eliminated because up to now, Chinese firms have never issued any types of preferred 
shares and there is no such a column according to Chinese accounting standards. 
As is suggested by a Q. Mei and G. Srinivasan (2011) report, in order to highlight the 
connection between cash holding and corporate market value, we have taken out cash value from 
the numerator and the denominator of the formula. Therefore, our modified Tobin’s Q (Q1) is 
defined as: 
𝑄1 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
 
In addition, our cash index, Q2, measuring the ratio of cash to the rest of the assets is 
defined as: 
𝑄2 =
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
 
With the above definitions, we can conclude that Q1, the performance indicator, is how 
the market values all assets other than cash. Therefore, if companies who are devoid of or with 
limited agency issues dominate the market, we can expect that higher level of cash holdings (Q2) 
will add value to the modified Tobin’s Q (Q1). Otherwise, if the majority of companies within the 
market suffer serious agency issues, we can expect a negative impact of Q2 on Q1. However, if 
the two types of companies offset each other over agency issues, we can barely observe any signs 
of connections. 
After calculating Q1 and Q2, we will introduce a multi-variable regression approach to 
obtain a more specific formula to express the non-linear quantitative relationship between the 
value of a firm and the amount of cash holdings that is represented by Q2. In this paper, we 
regard the market value of a firm as dependent variable while use cash holdings (Q2) as one of 
independent variables. In the regression equation, (Q2)2 is also included in the equation. 
Additionally, firms’ decisions on the amount of cash holdings are also influenced by other factors 
such as financial leverage, size of firms and cashflows. In this paper, we use Q1 as dependent 
variable. Considering approaches used in previous studies, we choose cashflows (later we call 
CFLOW), financial leverage (later we call FLEV) and size of firms (later we call LNA) as the 
other independent variables. The fluctuations in amount of cashflows represent various levels of 
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uncertainty. The frequent fluctuations potentially increase the possibility for a firm to give up 
investment opportunities and face financial distress.  FLEV represents the capacity of debt 
financing. As the larger the size of a firm is, the more possible for a firm to realize scale of 
economy. The following table summarizes the definitions as well as variables used in the later 
regression. 
Table 1. Definitions and Calculation methods of Related Variables 
Type Variables Symbol Definitions and Calculation Method 
Dependent Variable  Corporate Market Value Q1 Q1 represents corporate market value of firms. 
Independent Variable Cash Holdings  Q2 Q2 represents the ratio of cash to other assets. 
Controlling Variables 
Cashflows CFLOW 
CFLOW=(Net profit + Depreciation and 
amortization)/Total Assets 
Financial Leverage FLEV FLEV = Debt/Total Assets 
Size LNA Natural log of total assets 
  
The numerical relationship between these variables are expected to be observed and 
expressed in the following equation: 
𝑄1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑄2 + 𝛽2 ∗ (𝑄2)
2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐿𝑁𝐴 + ℰ 
where 𝛽0 is the constant, 𝛽𝑗 are the coefficients for different variables (j=1,2,…, 5), and ℰ 
represents the residuals.  
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4. Data and Statistical Summaries 
4.1 Tobin’s Q 
We select all A Shares (Shares denominated in local RMB, in contrast to B Shares, which 
are denominated in USD) listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), the largest stock exchange 
in China and fourth largest in the world, as our sample base. We divide all shares into six sectors 
based on CSRC standards, namely real estate, industrials, utilities, financials, commercial and 
generals. Due to the fact that the financial sector has different fiscal reporting standards, even 
though we managed to calculate its Q1 and Q2, we will not include this sector for further 
analysis. Our study covers a time span of ten years (2004-2013). All our data were obtained from 
CSMAR Database. Based on the data we collected, we calculate Q1 and Q2 by sectors together 
with average Q1, Q2 for ten years. To make analysis more convincible and accurate, we eliminate 
extreme observations by the following two standards: 
(1) Q1 greater than 5; 
(2) Q2 greater than 1. 
These two standards apply to observations only. Therefore, if one company was 
eliminated in one certain year, it can be in the sample for other years. 
The Q1 and Q2 average values by sectors in ten years are provided in the following Table 
2 and Table 3: 
Table 2. Average Values of Q1 by Sectors 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
Real Estate 1.4861 1.3115 1.7225 2.7506 1.4600 2.2050 1.7660 1.3542 1.3985 1.3560 1.6810 
Industrials 1.6635 1.3858 1.7004 2.7654 1.6097 2.5371 2.5036 1.9163 1.8026 1.8107 1.9695 
Utilities 2.0301 1.7369 2.0678 2.8574 1.7338 2.4471 2.1467 1.6121 1.5840 1.7207 1.9937 
Financials 1.7633 1.4596 2.6049 3.3120 1.6394 1.2719 1.6715 1.5683 1.4916 1.6084 1.8391 
Commercial 1.4539 1.3347 1.8490 3.0699 1.6225 2.6369 2.4518 1.9059 1.8260 1.8830 2.0034 
Generals 1.6848 1.3182 1.5305 2.7291 1.8306 2.6636 2.6126 2.1214 2.1066 2.1846 2.0782 
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Table 3. Average ratio of cash holdings (Q2) by sectors 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
Real Estate 0.1757 0.1534 0.1491 0.1812 0.1498 0.2395 0.2129 0.1620 0.1585 0.1616 0.1744 
Industrials 0.2116 0.1770 0.1595 0.1490 0.1670 0.1891 0.1971 0.1950 0.2013 0.1828 0.1829 
Utilities 0.2222 0.2044 0.1878 0.1624 0.1801 0.1781 0.1875 0.1956 0.2165 0.1829 0.1917 
Financials 0.2825 0.0972 0.1028 0.2332 0.1116 0.0786 0.4623 0.4688 0.4573 0.3382 0.2633 
Commercial 0.2445 0.2192 0.2026 0.1986 0.2305 0.2549 0.2711 0.2697 0.2577 0.2354 0.2384 
Generals 0.1533 0.1399 0.1497 0.1485 0.1291 0.1564 0.1572 0.1931 0.1785 0.1341 0.1540 
 
From tables above we discover that the generals sector has the highest Q1 and lowest Q2. 
This is a sample where agency issues dominate the industry and cash holding has a negative 
impact on overall corporate value. So this sector was eliminated for further analysis. And as 
mentioned above, financial sector was also eliminated. 
To test the dependency between cash holdings and corporate market value, we decide to 
use the Pearson Chi Squared Independence Test. The first step is to make a contingency table of 
the joint frequencies of the two events. The joint frequencies was then put into a table shown as 
following: 
 Q2>Q2 Average Q2<Q2 Average 
Q1>Q1 Average Frequency 1 Frequency 3 
Q1<Q1 Average Frequency 2 Frequency 4 
 
Our null hypothesis is that there is no dependency between Q1 and Q2, so in this way, the 
frequencies should be proportionally distributed between above or below average cash holding 
and corporate market valuation. Table 4 illustrates the Chi-squared value, the related P values and 
dependency results: 
Table 4. Pearson Chi Squared Independence Test results 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Chi-Sqr Value 18.4298  5.5028  14.3150  8.4122 2.4095  9.0445  50.0327  18.7530  23.7883  55.1351  
P Value 0.0018% 1.9000% 0.0155% 0.3700% 12.0600% 0.2600% 0.0000% 0.0015% 0.0001% 0.0000% 
Dependency Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent Independent Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent 
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With a significance level of 5%, for all years, if P Value is less than 5% then the null 
hypothesis is rejected, which means cash holdings and corporate market value are dependent, and 
otherwise independent. From the above table we can see clearly that during the ten-year period, 
only the year 2008 showed independence between Q1 and Q2. In 2008, China was severely 
affected by the global economic downturn then; the biggest growth engine - export was 
suffocated, SSE Index dropped from nearly 6000 points to 2000 points and investors suffer 
terrible losses.  
The next step is to examine the movements of individual sectors as well as the sign of 
correlation. We first look at the size of samples for different sectors. Real estate, commercial and 
generals are relatively too small in sample size to carry a sector wise analysis. However, 
industrials and utilities have enough sample bases (400+ and 100+ respectively), hence we would 
like to carry the study within these two sectors as shown in Table 5 below: 
Table 5. Chi-squared results for industrial and utility sectors 
Year Chi-Sqr Industrial P Value Chi-Sqr Utility P Value 
2004 12.7014 0.04% 13.1742 0.03% 
2005 4.7181 2.98% 3.3818 6.59% 
2006 5.2006 2.26% 13.4667 0.02% 
2007 2.7236 9.89% 12.3413 0.04% 
2008 1.2055 27.22% 8.255 0.41% 
2009 8.0556 0.45% 7.6547 0.57% 
2010 11.4202 0.07% 11.151 0.08% 
2011 2.5392 11.11% 15.4757 0.01% 
2012 6.5142 1.07% 15.9368 0.01% 
2013 33.5291 0.00% 22.5277 0.00% 
 
Using the same Pearson Chi-Squared Independence Test, with a significance level of 5% 
for all years, if P Value is less than 5% then the null hypothesis is rejected, which means cash 
holdings and corporate market value are dependent, and otherwise independent. From the above 
table, we can see in most of the ten years we can reject independent hypothesis.  
Then we use the correlation coefficient to determine whether the relation between cash 
holding and corporate market valuation is positive or negative within the two sectors. The 
correlations are shown in Table 6: 
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Table 6. Correlation between cash holding and corporate market valuation 
Year Industrial Utility 
2004 0.34  0.26  
2005 0.19  0.28  
2006 0.14  0.38  
2007 0.09  0.48  
2008 0.00  0.31  
2009 0.16  0.50  
2010 0.21  0.48  
2011 0.14  0.54  
2012 0.15  0.34  
2013 0.32  0.34  
 
 From the above table we can see that the correlation between cash holding and corporate 
market valuation is positive, which means cash holding adds value to the industrial and utility 
sectors. It appears that for both sectors, there was a decreasing trend in correlation from 2004 to 
2008, the correlation was lowest in 2008 and started increasing after the financial crisis. For the 
industrial sector, the correlation was close to zero in 2008, which suggests that the sector was 
heavily impacted by the export fatigue caused by the global economic downturn. In addition, base 
on the figures above, utility sector showed stronger correlation between cash holding and 
corporate market value than the industrial sector. 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Q1 4656 1.8776 1.5836 0.8944 0.4860 4.9859 
Q2 4656 0.1944 0.1463 0.1661 0.0002 0.9992 
Q2 Sq 4656 0.0654 0.0214 0.1212 0.0000 0.9985 
CFLOW 4656 0.0512 0.0536 0.1007 -2.3652 2.8865 
FLEV 4656 0.5423 0.5372 0.2251 0.0232 3.4012 
LNA 4656 21.8799 21.6851 1.3353 18.4749 28.4576 
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According to the descriptive statistics displayed in Table 7, no significant difference 
exists between mean and median for each variable. With an average of 19.44% and median of 
14.63% for Q2, which represents general level of cash holdings, Chinese listed companies tend to 
have relatively high level of cash holdings. Considering standard deviation of Q2 which is only 
0.1661, we believe that the amount of cash holdings does not vary significantly among different 
companies. Q1, the indicator for corporate market value of firms, varies between 0.4860 and 
4.9859. This surprising result reveals significant diversion among companies in corporate market 
value.  
Before direct analysis of data during the financial crisis, a general multivariate regression 
result will offer us a more specific view about the whole Chinese market. Referring to previous 
study, we predict that positive relationship will be found between Q1 and Q2. As we have already 
excluded the extreme values, we obtain the following regression results that apparently support 
our prediction with positive coefficients for Q2, CFLOW and FLEV.  
We first try the multivariate regression assuming with a constant. The result, however, is 
not desirable. As we can see from Table 8, R-squared value is 14.06%, indicating only 14.06% of 
Q1s can be explained through the five independent variables. Moreover, referring to P value for 
(Q2)2 that is as high as 0.8050, the regression results are not satisfying and comes with rejection 
of null hypothesis for Q2. Furthermore, as the constant term is relatively big, reaching around 6, 
we decide to try the multivariate regression without the constant term.   
Table 8. Regression Results with Constant 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 4656 6 0.8296048 0.1406 152.0938 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 0.950649 0.2069838 4.59 0.0000 0.5448626 1.356435 
Q2 Sq -0.0691969 0.280667 -0.25 0.8050 -0.6194374 0.4810436 
CFLOW 1.143789 0.1342541 8.52 0.0000 0.8805877 1.406991 
FLEV 0.2947478 0.0606611 4.86 0.0000 0.1758233 0.4136723 
LNA -0.2296259 0.009439 -24.33 0.0000 -0.2481307 -0.2111211 
Constant 6.503187 0.2042302 31.84 0.0000 6.102799 6.903575 
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The multivariate regression results without a constant term are displayed in Table 9. We 
are surprised to find that the R-squared value hits an amazing 80.64%. We tend to consider non-
constant multivariate regression model a good method to describe the relationship among Q1, Q2, 
(Q2)2, CFLOW, FLEV and LNA. Specifically, the coefficient for Q2 is significantly larger than 
other coefficients. This obvious result indicates that the amount of cash holdings plays important 
role in the valuation of Chinese listed companies.  
Table 9. Regression Results without Constant 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 4656 5 0.915498 0.8064 3875.328 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 1.844174 0.2263051 8.15 0.0000 1.400508 2.287839 
Q2 Sq -0.998594 0.3080466 -3.24 0.0010 -1.602511 -0.3946765 
CFLOW 0.4807438 0.1463613 3.28 0.0010 0.1938063 0.7676814 
FLEV 0.2993488 0.0669415 4.47 0.0000 0.1681118 0.4305858 
LNA 0.062818 0.0024042 26.13 0.0000 0.0581047 0.0675313 
 
Referring to Table 9, the relationship among Q1, Q2, (Q2)2, CFLOW, FLEV and LNA 
can be expressed in the following way:  
𝑄1 = 1.844174 ∗ Q2 − 0.998594 ∗ (𝑄2)2 + 0.4807438 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 0.2993488 ∗ 𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑉
+ 0.062818 ∗ 𝐿𝑁𝐴 
Now, we turn to the case during financial crisis between 2008 and 2009. The following 
Table 10 summarizes the regression results without constant. Although the R-squared value hits a 
0.8087 high, we cannot ignore that for the two specific coefficients of CFLOW and FLEV, of 
which the P values exceeds 10%, reaching 88.40% and 24.50% respectively, signifying the 
rejection of null hypothesis, we then decide to try the case with constant. 
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Table 10. Regression Results during Financial Crisis without Constant  
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 1509 5 0.9826878 0.8087 1271.623 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 2.566854 0.4475388 5.74 0.0000 1.688988 3.44472 
Q2 Sq -2.430722 0.6772245 -3.59 0.0000 -3.759127 -1.102317 
CFLOW -0.0480464 0.3288734 -0.15 0.8840 -0.6931455 0.5970527 
FLEV 0.1504725 0.1294688 1.16 0.2450 -0.1034861 0.4044311 
LNA 0.0723035 0.0046201 15.65 0.0000 0.063241 0.0813659 
 
We then run a multivariate regression for the case with constant. While the R-squared 
value is a moderate 0.1531, we find that all the P values of five coefficients small and satisfying, 
no P value rejects the null hypothesis that independent variable are significantly correlated with 
the dependent variable at 95% confidence interval.  
From the table below, we can find that the coefficients for Q2 experienced a falling trend, 
decreasing from 1.844174 to 1.448201. This phenomenon indicates that the level of cash holdings 
exerts less influence on the valuation of firms during financial crisis.  
Table 11. Regression Results during Financial Crisis with Constant 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 1509 6 0.8737443 0.1531 54.33097 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 1.448201 0.4018407 3.6 0.0000 0.6599729 2.236429 
Q2 Sq -0.9966913 0.6064055 -1.64 0.1000 -2.186182 0.1927996 
CFLOW 0.8980796 0.2962208 3.03 0.0020 0.3170296 1.47913 
FLEV 0.2227634 0.1151724 1.93 0.0530 -0.0031522 0.448679 
LNA -0.2692134 0.0175747 -15.32 0.0000 -0.303687 -0.2347399 
Constant 7.57397 0.3789655 19.99 0.0000 6.830613 8.317327 
 
For both cases, we also find that the coefficients Q22 are negative. This finding coincides 
with D.H. Wang and H.G. Wang (2007) that there exists an inverted U-shape relationship 
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between cash holdings and firms’ value. We managed to plot the general relation between Q1 and 
Q2 in both with and without constant situations. The plots show very clear inverted U-shapes. 
Also, for the during crisis situations, the inverted U-shapes seem to be more compressed than the 
general cases, which also proves that during the crisis, cash holding casts less influence on firm 
valuation. 
Graph 1. General Relation between Q1 and Q2 (without constant)  
 
 
Graph 2. General Relation between Q1 and Q2 (with constant) 
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However, as we can see from the plots that the discrepancy between the cases with and 
without a constant is quite large. The reason for such a difference lies in the absolute value of the 
constant. From previous tables we find that the constants for the general case and during crisis 
period are 6.503187 and 7.57397 respectively, and they are multiple times larger than any of the 
other coefficients. 
Based on previous studies, we believe that a lack of related variables for regression is a 
cause for such a discrepancy. In order to narrow down the difference, we decide to add one more 
related variable, Percentage of State Ownership (PSO) to our regression. Due to China’s 
communist regime, entities with a state ownership background have an advantage in obtaining 
financing (especially cash) from financial institutions over the ones with private ownership. And 
the market views differently on the cash holdings of SOEs (Stated Owned Enterprises) and 
private enterprises. We obtained the percentage of shares owned by the state for all A Shares 
listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange from the same CSMAR database from 2004-2013. Based on 
the new data, we did the regression for both the general case and during the crisis period. And the 
results are shown in the following Table 12 and Table 13. 
Table 12. Regression Results for General Case with Constant and PSO 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 4656 7 0.814671 0.1714 160.2974 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 0.874354 0.203386 4.30 0.0000 0.475621 1.273087 
Q2 Sq -0.055847 0.275822 -0.20 0.8400 -0.708283 0.596589 
CFLOW 1.162622 0.131846 8.82 0.0000 0.904142 1.421102 
FLEV 0.244263 0.059693 4.09 0.0000 0.127236 0.361290 
LNA -0.220512 0.009296 -23.72 0.0000 -0.238738 -0.202287 
PSO -0.623914 0.047342 -13.18 0.0000 -0.716728 -0.531101 
Constant 4.803131 0.247315 19.42 0.0000 4.318171 5.288091 
The result seems similar to the previous situation with moderate R-squared value and 
relatively satisfactory P value except for Q2 Sq. However, the constant term experienced a 
downward trend from 6.503187 to 4.803131. This phenomenon indicates that PSO is a related 
variable which helps to bring down the discrepancy.  
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Table 13. Regression Results during Financial Crisis with Constant and PSO 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 1509 7 0.867958 0.1651 49.48659 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 1.367397 0.399845 3.42 0.0010 0.583083 2.151712 
Q2 Sq -0.874339 0.603252 -1.45 0.1001 -2.057644 0.308967 
CFLOW 0.939977 0.294400 3.19 0.0010 0.362499 1.517456 
FLEV 0.221453 0.114426 1.94 0.0530 -0.002999 0.445905 
LNA -0.245647 0.018168 -13.52 0.0000 -0.281285 -0.210009 
PSO -0.486852 0.103732 -4.69 0.0000 -0.690327 -0.283378 
Constant 5.914803 0.485537 12.18 0.0000 4.961769 6.867837 
Similarly, the constant for the during crisis situation dropped from 7.57397 to 5.91480, 
which also proves PSO a relevant variable that helps to narrow the difference. 
However, the constants for both cases are still quite large comparing to other coefficients, 
which means that maybe more variables should be considered or added to the regression. To 
obtain better results needs further researches based on Chinese contents.  
In conclusion, during a longer time horizon, the level of cash holdings expose significant 
influence on Chinese listed companies with high correlation and high positive coefficient. During 
financial crisis, holding cash has fewer effects on the Chinese listed companies with lower 
positive coefficient. However, we cannot deny the significant relationship between corporate 
market value and cash holdings.  
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5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, our study proves that corporate market valuation is positively related to 
cash holdings in China. We also discover that the correlation is not uniform between sectors and 
is affected by the financial crisis. The null hypothesis (independency) was rejected by and large 
with a base of considerable amount of data by the Pearson Chi-Squared Independency Test.  
What is more, we find a numeric way to express the relationship among Q1, Q2, Q22, 
CFLOW, FLEV and LNA. That is  
𝑄1 = 1.844174 ∗ Q2 − 0.998594 ∗ (𝑄2)2 + 0.4807438 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 + 0.2993488 ∗ 𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑉
+ 0.062818 ∗ 𝐿𝑁𝐴 
However, to obtain better results, more variables should be considered or added to the 
regression, which needs further researches based on Chinese contents.  
The general relation between Q1 and Q2 fits an inverted U-shape, which coincides D.H. 
Wang and H.G. Wang’s finding in 2007. This shape means that an increase in cash holdings 
would lead to a rise in firm value when the amount of cash holdings is within a certain limit. 
However, if cash holding exceeds a certain level, the existence of agency issues would drive the 
value of firms downward. Moreover, during financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese market tended to 
receive less influence from cash holdings, but the positive relationship between Q1 and Q2 still 
exists.  
However, due to the imperfection of Chinese stock market and a rather implosive market-
oriented economy, our study results may not be universal. A wider time span covering a greater 
number of market crises will enhance our findings. Meanwhile, by extending the study to more 
settings featuring both developed and developing countries will also enhance our research 
findings. 
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Appendices  
MatLab Codes1 
1. Script for inputs 
close all; 
clear all; 
clc; 
  
tab = [28 16;12 52]; % This is a sample contingency table of the joint frequencies 
[hNull, pVal, X2] = PearsonChi2Test(tab, 0.05) % Set significance level to 5% 
 
2. Function for Pearson Chi-Squared Independency Test 
 
function [hNull, pValue, Chi2] = PearsonChi2Test(cotab, a) 
    %#  CHISQUARETEST  Pearson's Chi-Square test of independence 
    %# 
    %#    @param cotab      The Contingency Table of the joint frequencies 
    %#                      of the two events (attributes) 
    %#    @param a          Significance level for the test 
    %# 
    %#    @return hNull     hNull = 1: null hypothesis accepted (independent) 
    %#                      hNull = 0: null hypothesis rejected (dependent) 
    %#    @return pValue    The p-value of the test (the prob of obtaining 
    %#                      the observed frequencies under hNull) 
    %#    @return Chi2      The value for the chi square statistic 
   
    [r, c] = size(cotab); 
    % degree of freedom 
    dof = (r-1)*(c-1); 
  
    % expected frequency 
    e = sum(cotab,2)*sum(cotab,1) / sum(cotab(:)); 
                                                     
1 The MatLab function is adapted from http://stackoverflow.com/questions/3356128/matlab-test-of-independence 
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    % Get Chi2 value 
    Chi2 = sum(sum( (cotab-e).^2 ./ e )); 
  
    % Compare P Value with a to get hNull 
    pValue = 1 - chi2cdf(Chi2, dof); 
hNull = (pValue > a); 
 
 end 
 
Table 1. Definitions and Calculation methods of Related Variables 
Type Variables Symbol Definitions and Calculation Method 
Dependent Variable Corporate Market Value Q1 Q1 represents corporate market value of firms. 
Independent 
Variable 
Cash Holdings Q2 Q2 represents the ratio of cash to other assets. 
Controlling 
Variables 
Cashflows CFLOW 
CFLOW=(Net profit + Depreciation and 
amortization)/Total Assets 
Financial Leverage FLEV FLEV = Debt/Total Assets 
Size LNA Natural log of totall assets 
 
Table 2. Average Values of Q1 by Sectors 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
Real Estate 1.4861 1.3115 1.7225 2.7506 1.4600 2.2050 1.7660 1.3542 1.3985 1.3560 1.6810 
Industrials 1.6635 1.3858 1.7004 2.7654 1.6097 2.5371 2.5036 1.9163 1.8026 1.8107 1.9695 
Utilities 2.0301 1.7369 2.0678 2.8574 1.7338 2.4471 2.1467 1.6121 1.5840 1.7207 1.9937 
Financials 1.7633 1.4596 2.6049 3.3120 1.6394 1.2719 1.6715 1.5683 1.4916 1.6084 1.8391 
Commercial 1.4539 1.3347 1.8490 3.0699 1.6225 2.6369 2.4518 1.9059 1.8260 1.8830 2.0034 
Generals 1.6848 1.3182 1.5305 2.7291 1.8306 2.6636 2.6126 2.1214 2.1066 2.1846 2.0782 
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Table 3. Average ratio of cash holdings (Q2) by sectors 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
Real Estate 0.1757 0.1534 0.1491 0.1812 0.1498 0.2395 0.2129 0.1620 0.1585 0.1616 0.1744 
Industrials 0.2116 0.1770 0.1595 0.1490 0.1670 0.1891 0.1971 0.1950 0.2013 0.1828 0.1829 
Utilities 0.2222 0.2044 0.1878 0.1624 0.1801 0.1781 0.1875 0.1956 0.2165 0.1829 0.1917 
Financials 0.2825 0.0972 0.1028 0.2332 0.1116 0.0786 0.4623 0.4688 0.4573 0.3382 0.2633 
Commercial 0.2445 0.2192 0.2026 0.1986 0.2305 0.2549 0.2711 0.2697 0.2577 0.2354 0.2384 
Generals 0.1533 0.1399 0.1497 0.1485 0.1291 0.1564 0.1572 0.1931 0.1785 0.1341 0.1540 
 
 
Table 4. Pearson Chi Squared Independence Test results 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Chi Sqr Value 18.4298  5.5028  14.3150  8.4122 2.4095  9.0445  50.0327  18.7530  23.7883  55.1351  
P Value 0.0018% 1.9000% 0.0155% 0.3700% 12.0600% 0.2600% 0.0000% 0.0015% 0.0001% 0.0000% 
Dependency Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent Independent Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent 
 
 
Table 5. Chi-squared results for industrial and utility sectors 
Year Chi-Sqr Industrial P Value Chi-Sqr Utility P Value 
2004 12.7014 0.04% 13.1742 0.03% 
2005 4.7181 2.98% 3.3818 6.59% 
2006 5.2006 2.26% 13.4667 0.02% 
2007 2.7236 9.89% 12.3413 0.04% 
2008 1.2055 27.22% 8.255 0.41% 
2009 8.0556 0.45% 7.6547 0.57% 
2010 11.4202 0.07% 11.151 0.08% 
2011 2.5392 11.11% 15.4757 0.01% 
2012 6.5142 1.07% 15.9368 0.01% 
2013 33.5291 0.00% 22.5277 0.00% 
 
 
  29 
 
 
Table 6. Correlation between cash holding and corporate market valuation 
Year Industrial Utility 
2004 0.34 0.26 
2005 0.19 0.28 
2006 0.14 0.38 
2007 0.09 0.48 
2008 0.00 0.31 
2009 0.16 0.50 
2010 0.21 0.48 
2011 0.14 0.54 
2012 0.15 0.34 
2013 0.32 0.34 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Q1 4656 1.8776 1.5836 0.8944 0.4860 4.9859 
Q2 4656 0.1944 0.1463 0.1661 0.0002 0.9992 
Q2 Sq 4656 0.0654 0.0214 0.1212 0.0000 0.9985 
CFLOW 4656 0.0512 0.0536 0.1007 -2.3652 2.8865 
FLEV 4656 0.5423 0.5372 0.2251 0.0232 3.4012 
LNA 4656 21.8799 21.6851 1.3353 18.4749 28.4576 
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Table 8. Regression Results with Constant 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 4656 6 0.8296048 0.1406 152.0938 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 0.950649 0.2069838 4.59 0.0000 0.5448626 1.356435 
Q2 Sq -0.0691969 0.280667 -0.25 0.8050 -0.6194374 0.4810436 
CFLOW 1.143789 0.1342541 8.52 0.0000 0.8805877 1.406991 
FLEV 0.2947478 0.0606611 4.86 0.0000 0.1758233 0.4136723 
LNA -0.2296259 0.009439 -24.33 0.0000 -0.2481307 -0.2111211 
Constant 6.503187 0.2042302 31.84 0.0000 6.102799 6.903575 
 
 
 
Table 9. Regression Results without Constant 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 4656 5 0.915498 0.8064 3875.328 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 1.844174 0.2263051 8.15 0.0000 1.400508 2.287839 
Q2 Sq -0.998594 0.3080466 -3.24 0.0010 -1.602511 -0.3946765 
CFLOW 0.4807438 0.1463613 3.28 0.0010 0.1938063 0.7676814 
FLEV 0.2993488 0.0669415 4.47 0.0000 0.1681118 0.4305858 
LNA 0.062818 0.0024042 26.13 0.0000 0.0581047 0.0675313 
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Table 10. Regression Results during Financial Crisis with Constant 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 1509 6 0.8737443 0.1531 54.33097 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 1.448201 0.4018407 3.6 0.0000 0.6599729 2.236429 
Q2 Sq -0.9966913 0.6064055 -1.64 0.1000 -2.186182 0.1927996 
CFLOW 0.8980796 0.2962208 3.03 0.0020 0.3170296 1.47913 
FLEV 0.2227634 0.1151724 1.93 0.0530 -0.0031522 0.448679 
LNA -0.2692134 0.0175747 -15.32 0.0000 -0.303687 -0.2347399 
Constant 7.57397 0.3789655 19.99 0.0000 6.830613 8.317327 
 
 
 
Table 11. Regression Results during Financial Crisis without Constant 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 1509 5 0.9826878 0.8087 1271.623 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 2.566854 0.4475388 5.74 0.0000 1.688988 3.44472 
Q2 Sq -2.430722 0.6772245 -3.59 0.0000 -3.759127 -1.102317 
CFLOW -0.0480464 0.3288734 -0.15 0.8840 -0.6931455 0.5970527 
FLEV 0.1504725 0.1294688 1.16 0.2450 -0.1034861 0.4044311 
LNA 0.0723035 0.0046201 15.65 0.0000 0.063241 0.0813659 
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Table 12. Regression Results for General Case with Constant and PSO 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 4656 7 0.814671 0.1714 160.2974 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 0.874354 0.203386 4.30 0.0000 0.475621 1.273087 
Q2 Sq -0.055847 0.275822 -0.20 0.8400 -0.708283 0.596589 
CFLOW 1.162622 0.131846 8.82 0.0000 0.904142 1.421102 
FLEV 0.244263 0.059693 4.09 0.0000 0.127236 0.361290 
LNA -0.220512 0.009296 -23.72 0.0000 -0.238738 -0.202287 
PSO -0.623914 0.047342 -13.18 0.0000 -0.716728 -0.531101 
Constant 4.803131 0.247315 19.42 0.0000 4.318171 5.288091 
 
 
Table 13. Regression Results during Financial Crisis with Constant and PSO 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE R-Sq F P 
Q1 1509 7 0.867958 0.1651 49.48659 0.0000 
       
Q1 Coef. Std.Err. t P 95% Confidence Interval 
Q2 1.367397 0.399845 3.42 0.0010 0.583083 2.151712 
Q2 Sq -0.874339 0.603252 -1.45 0.1001 -2.057644 0.308967 
CFLOW 0.939977 0.294400 3.19 0.0010 0.362499 1.517456 
FLEV 0.221453 0.114426 1.94 0.0530 -0.002999 0.445905 
LNA -0.245647 0.018168 -13.52 0.0000 -0.281285 -0.210009 
PSO -0.486852 0.103732 -4.69 0.0000 -0.690327 -0.283378 
Constant 5.914803 0.485537 12.18 0.0000 4.961769 6.867837 
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Graph 1. General Relation between Q1 and Q2 (without constant) 
 
 
Graph 2. General Relation between Q1 and Q2 (with constant) 
 
 
